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1. Introduction
Nowadays most of the big companies pride themselves on their social 
responsibility. When visiting the websites of IBM, Cisco, ING, Philips, 
BP, etc., one will easily find a tab called ‘corporate social responsibility’, 
or ‘sustainability’.1 Here, companies describe how they contribute to the 
community and balance their impact on the environment. Why do they 
do that? There is a long tradition of moral considerations for commerce. 
In the early days of capitalism, the goal of the business was solely to make 
profits. This changed when business was challenged by social movements 
and legislation (Carroll, 1991: 39). Nowadays, business is not only respon-
sive to external pressure, but is rather proactive in its social responsibility. 
Companies keep extending their responsible agenda, often going beyond 
legislation. It appears that companies have adopted their ethical dimen-
sion. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) seems to have found a way 
to make capitalism work for societies, with businesses driving social bet-
terment. 
 There is no unified approach to CSR. It consists of a myriad of diverse 
approaches. However, one popular stream of thought can be identified 
within CSR literature (Garriga & Melé, 2004: 53). This type of CSR theo-
rising claims that the profitability of CSR supports a sustainable interface 
between business interests and social interests. It asserts that once it is 
acknowledged that the social and environmental responsibility of busi-
nesses pays off, aligning CSR with the shareholders’ interest of making 
money, it will make the capitalist system work to society’s advantage.  In 
other words, provided that companies recognise the profit to be made by 
implementing CSR policies, their operations will, as usual, be self-inter-
ested, but serving society at the same time. 
 CSR became one of the leading frameworks to think about moral 
responsibility in business. From the perspective of moral philosophy, CSR 
can be regarded as a response to allegedly ineffective business ethics based 
on moral duty claims or appeals to values like equality, justice or rights. 
CSR has been addressed by companies, governments and supranational 
bodies like the European Union and the United Nations. CSR comes 
to the fore especially in areas where legal obligation ends but environ-
mental and social needs remain unmet. So, with many arguing that CSR 
has already proven its social worth (e.g. Matten & Moon, 2008: 416), it 
appears that CSR could move the business sector to benefit our societies 
and our environment. 
 In order to see the bigger picture, we should, however, consider this 
claim within the context of changing relation between the state and the 
market.
 There is a trend in the United States and Europe to transfer traditional 
state functions (education, transport, pension, environmental protection, 
etc.) to the business sector (Matten & Moon: 415). Scholars argue that 
this retreat of the state is caused by globalisation. Globalisation causes a 
‘partial denationalizing of national territory and a partial shift of some 
components of state sovereignty to other institutions, from supranational 
entities to the global capital market’ (Sassen, 1996: 4). Therefore a dis-
tinctive feature of globalisation is a changed division of responsibilities 
between the state and the market. The state adopts the market ideology as 
part of the process of ‘marketisation’1 and the market takes on the ethical 
functions through its ‘responsibilisation’ (Shamir, 2008). ‘Responsibilisa-
tion’ responds to the missing or ineffective international regulations that 
would cover global corporate activities and to business lobbying against 
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coercive regulations, but in favour of self-regulation (in the form of CSR). 
 The retreat of the state doesn’t mean that laws no longer work - they 
often do, but the law does not necessarily have to be at the forefront of 
social change. State-driven law is not the sole source of regulation any-
more; on the contrary, there is a complex system of private and public 
sources of regulation (Shamir, 2008). In such a matrix, corporations can 
choose which regulation to apply, for instance which charter to sign or 
which ranking to participate in. What is more, they are involved in creat-
ing these regulations, for example by participating in multi-stakeholder 
consultations or by sponsoring the agencies that specialise in CSR report-
ing and accreditation. For that reason, critics of CSR (Shamir, 2008; Kuhn 
& Deetz, 2008) stress the dangers of an optimistic attitude towards CSR. 
They doubt that self-motivated and self-imposed regulations of corporate 
citizens are more effective than state-imposed regulations. It is therefore 
reasonable to ask: can moral philosophers advise on how to approach CSR, 
with social goals in mind? These issues can  – and should – be investigated 
by moral philosophy.
 In this paper I will examine the proposition that seems to be at the 
core of mainstream CSR: CSR can integrate market goals and the interests 
of society by mediating between the two in places where they tradition-
ally come apart.2 My thesis is that this integration is very unstable due to 
CSR’s primary commitment to market goals. This position places me on 
one of the sides of the ongoing debate about whether CSR is a reaction to 
neoliberalism or its product (Lebano, 2010: 14). I suggest that the popular 
approach to CSR is much closer to a traditional neoliberal stance, most 
famously articulated by the title of Milton Friedman’s in his 1970 article 
The Only Social Responsibility of Business is to Maximize its Profits – in which 
he claims that ‘business needs no ethics’, – than what the proponents of 
this popular approach to CSR would like to admit.
 The next section defines what CSR is exactly and what its constitutive 
features are. The following section, called ‘CSR and moral philosophy’, 
places CSR in a wider philosophical debate. Subsequently, in the section 
on CSR and the business case, I explain what the CSR business case is and 
explore its relation to the neoclassical concept of market logic. Thereafter 
I present some instances of conflicting social and business interests - the 
problem of CSR’s empirical grounds, the issue of public opinion prefer-
ences and the risks of free riding mechanisms.
2. Defining CSR
The term ‘corporate social responsibility’ has been gaining popularity 
since the 1970s, and is associated with a wide range of corporate practices 
like employee diversity, carbon neutrality, support for local communi-
ties, improvement of working conditions in suppliers’ factories, socially 
and environmentally responsible financial investments, etc. Sometimes it 
is referred to as Corporate Social Performance (Wood, 1991), Corporate 
Citizenship (Zadek, 2001), or Sustainable Business (Vogel, 2005: 16).
 Alan Neal (2008), in his attempt to systematise various definitions 
of CSR, concluded that most authors agree that CSR makes a norma-
tive claim, since it says what ought to be done: ‘[…] businesses need to 
integrate the economic, social, and environmental impact in their opera-
tions’ (2008: 465). The definitions also specify how this should be done 
- namely, CSR needs to be embedded in ‘the way in which businesses are 
managed’ (Neal, 2008: 465). This means that companies need to take into 
account other stakeholders’ interests, such as local communities, custom-
ers or trade unions and incorporate CSR in a thorough manner – not as 
an add-on to their ‘business as usual’, but by integrating these considera-
tions into the very core of their management strategy. However, these two 
features are not what makes CSR’s concept different from other business 
ethics approaches. Neal reports the third constitutive feature of CSR – vol-
untariness and alignment with the organisation’s own long-term interest: 
‘CSR is behaviour by businesses over and above legal requirements, volun-
tarily adopted because businesses deem it to be in their long-term interest’ 
(2008: 465).
 This last feature – voluntariness and being in organisation’s interest – 
informs the ‘business case for CSR’, which I address in a later paragraph. I 
take the business case aspect as constitutive of CSR. I am aware that other 
interpretations of CSR exist which are more in line with traditional busi-
ness ethics and do not include the business case aspect (see: ethical CSR 
theories in Garriga & Melé, 2004: 60). I will refer to them in the next 
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section as primarily based on another kind of reasoning – on duty, moral 
values, rights, etc. When I refer to CSR I will mean only the approach that 
has the business case at its centre. 
 But before I discuss the notion of the business case for CSR and its 
consequences, I would like to show where CSR lies within the wider dis-
cussion of relations between morality and business, as well as clarify key 
terms which will be used throughout the essay.
3. CSR and moral philosophy
CSR can be classified as one of the theories within business ethics. Busi-
ness ethics is a branch of philosophy and is defined as an ‘applied ethics 
discipline that addresses the moral features of commercial activity’ (Mar-
coux, 2008). Business ethics, if understood broadly as a moral reflection 
on commerce, has accompanied trade since its origins (Marcoux, 2008). 
As a contemporary and independent discipline, business ethics is focused 
on business corporations. These are large, publicly traded enterprises that 
often operate internationally. In this essay I, too, will speak of corpora-
tions, sometimes referring to them as companies, or simply as businesses 
(when emphasising general market mechanisms which affect both small 
and big enterprises). In general, I will use these different terms as refer-
ences to commercial organisations operating in a capitalist system that is 
characterised by the logic of capital accumulation and competition (Heil-
broner, 2008). 
 Let us now look at how different moral philosophies approach the 
troublesome relation between commercial activity and morality. Subse-
quently I will try to position CSR within this context.
 It is argued that there are currently three major approaches in norma-
tive ethics: virtue ethics, deontology and consequentialism (Hursthouse, 
2010). Virtue ethics emphasises moral character. Applying this to business 
ethics, a moral philosopher who argues for morally bound corporations 
can do so by claiming that corporations, like natural persons, should have 
certain moral qualities and can be praised or blamed for behaving accord-
ingly or not. From a deontological perspective, which puts duties or rules 
in the centre, the philosopher would claim the existence of a certain moral 
duty that corporations have towards stakeholders. Finally, consequential-
ists, like deontologists, would argue for attention to stakeholders’ interests 
on different grounds – through an appeal to consequences of corporate 
actions. 
 All three moral philosophies can form the normative core of corporate 
responsibility. They all answer the question as to why ‘businesses need to 
integrate the economic, social, and environmental impact in their opera-
tions’ (Neal, 2008: 465), albeit in different ways. 
 In other words, they serve the same purpose of providing philosophi-
cally sound reasons for businesses to care about social interests.
 How is it done in practice? For example, Adam Smith, in his Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, prescribes strong normative directives – entrepreneurs 
should act according to virtues like prudence, temperance, civility, indus-
triousness and honesty. Without these virtues commerce would neither 
work in societies’ advantage nor provide ethical progress (Ashley, 2010: 
8–9; Wells & Graafland, 2012: 321-323). 
 This moral quality can be applied not only to individuals but also to 
collective bodies like a university or a corporation by treating them like 
moral agents, as if they were individuals. Peter French (Marcoux, 2008) 
advocates this approach in order to argue that corporations also have a 
(collective) moral responsibility3 towards societies and the environment.
 An example of corporate responsibility based on the duty approach 
can be found in the stakeholder theory developed initially by Freeman 
(Garriga and Melé, 2004: 60). Here the very purpose of the firm is the 
coordination of and joint service to its stakeholders (Marcoux, 2008).
 But CSR as defined by Neal doesn’t use virtue ethics or deontology 
as its justification. This is contrary to the fact that CSR has responsibility 
in its name, which suggests certain duties or obligations that business has 
towards the society (the latter also featuring in the name). 
 In fact, CSR takes its justification from the third type of normative 
approach towards business ethics - consequentialism. Consequentialism 
asserts that whether an act is morally right depends only on its conse-
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quences (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011). This entails that in a moral appraisal 
of an act we look solely at its consequences, not duties, the moral character 
of an agent or the intrinsic character of the act or circumstances. 
 A particular type of consequentialism is represented in Milton Fried-
man’s 1970 article in the New York Times Magazine. Ever since, Friedman’s 
words have been a point of reference for many articles on CSR (e.g. Bird 
et al., 2007: 190; Carroll, 1991; Garriga & Melé, 2004: 64; Matten & 
Moon, 2008: 405; Griffin & Mahon, 1997). Friedman argues that ‘there is 
one and only one social responsibility of business - to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within 
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competi-
tion without deception or fraud’ (Friedman 1970). This is predominantly 
a consequentialist approach because the activity is not appraised per se, 
but only compared to a particular end, which equals increasing profits.4 
We can say that Friedman provides yet another take on business ethics – a 
stand that business doesn’t need any ethics, besides the minimum require-
ment of refraining from deception and fraud.
 Why, then, does Friedman call this a social responsibility? Because, 
according to Friedman and all those who followed the neoliberal inter-
pretation of the invisible hand theorem, the pursuit of shareholder value 
maximization by businesses in a free and competitive market will achieve 
maximum efficiency and optimally satisfy the needs of the greatest amount 
of people (Duska, 2007: 53). So the free market should produce the maxi-
mum amount of well-being, which is the ethical goal. Pursuing other 
goals than maximizing shareholders value, according to Friedman, would 
even obscure market mechanisms, and subsequently force companies into 
bankruptcy. 
 One might ask whether Friedman’s quote is not outdated and no longer 
representative of the proponents of CSR in today’s competitive market. 
After all, no one who wants to seriously advocate CSR would phrase his 
or her argument as Friedman did. The fame of Friedman’s words comes 
partly from his influence on the discipline of economics, and partly from 
the bluntness of his formulations, but also from the fact that they encapsu-
late the whole neoliberal conception of the function and legitimacy of the 
business. We have to remember here that in accordance with neoclassical 
economics, the law in most capitalist countries obliges corporations to cre-
ate maximum wealth for its owners – the shareholders (Heilbroner, 2008). 
Therefore Friedman’s quote does represent the status quo of the 1970’s as 
well as of today, as the corporate fiduciary duty towards owners, known 
as the ‘shareholder theory’, roughly equals Friedman’s position (Marcoux, 
2008). As I will discuss in the next chapter, the position of the business 
case proves that CSR is in line with shareholder theory. This means that 
Neal’s and Friedman’s definitions of CSR are not so far from one another. 
Both statements come down to the primacy of profit – Friedman’s explic-
itly and Neal’s implicitly.
 In this section I have suggested that the concept of CSR is closer to 
consequentialist shareholder theory than to deontological and virtue eth-
ics approaches to the relation between business and society. Subsequently, 
I will show that the commitment to CSR based on its profitability for 
business shares the shortcomings of the shareholder theory represented by 
Friedman.
4. The Business case for CSR
The business case for CSR postulates that socially responsible behaviour 
brings material benefit to the company. Bob Willard (2002), a promoter 
of CSR’s business value, writes: ‘Saving the world and making a profit is 
not an either/or proposition; it is a both/and proposition. Good environ-
mental and social programs make good business sense.’ (Willard, 2002: 3). 
Duska summarises the business case line of thinking with a slogan ‘Good 
Ethics is Good Business’ (2007: 57). Numerous publications discuss the 
benefits that CSR brings to companies (Orlitzky et al., 2003). The most 
popular ones are the following: easier hiring and higher retention of top 
talent, increased employee productivity and innovation, reduced manufac-
turing expenses, reduced expenses at commercial sites, increased revenues 
and market share, reduced risk and easier financing (Willard, 2002). 
Empirical research on these benefits, however, does not always verify the 
alleged correlation between ethical and financial performance (Bird et al., 
2007: 191-193; Crane et al., 2008: 4; Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Trebucq & 
D’Arcimoles, 2002). Some studies confirm the correlation, some deny it 
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and others find that it is limited to certain areas of responsibility (Kurucz 
et al., 2008; Bird et al., 2007). Despite this academic dissensus, CSR is a 
popular theory and a widespread practice. It seems that CSR has gained 
popularity because of the way it attempts to commit businesses to social 
and environmental causes. Since duty-, rights- or virtue-based appeals to 
the business often remain unanswered, the bottom line argument appears 
to be a good, workable alternative. CSR is associated with the ‘soft’ (as 
opposed to ‘hard’, i.e. legally forced), self-binding and self-perpetuating 
regulations driven by the market itself. The need for market-fit ethics 
is described by Heath (2007), who criticizes existing business ethics for 
being ineffective, anti-capitalist and too demanding (2007: 360). Heath 
calls for another kind of business ethics that would be compatible with 
the logic of free market competition. His ‘adversarial ethics’ (Heath, 2007) 
aims to stay within this logic, but to arrive at the ‘greater good’ result. The 
business case approach to CSR seems to be in line with Heath’s objective 
of aligning goals of competitive players with the greater, common good. 
CSR should work like this: once the market recognises that CSR pays off 
and there is ‘money on the table’, companies will compete to be the most 
responsible and a ‘race to the top’-effect will be triggered. As a result, eve-
ryone benefits.
 As we can see, CSR rests on a premise that goals of the market and 
social responsibility are compatible. However, critics of CSR stress that 
business interests and the interests of society can converge, but may also 
clash. For example, in his book on CSR and virtue, David Vogel describes 
this relation as follows: ‘CSR is sustainable only if virtue pays off. The 
supply of corporate virtue is both made possible and constrained by the 
market’ (2005: 2–3). To illustrate, when corporate social or environmental 
impact suggests doing ‘x’, but the imperative of profit maximisation points 
to the opposite, ‘y’, a corporation is obliged to do ‘y’ by its shareholder 
duty. As Duska puts it, ‘when good ethics is not good business, so much 
the worse for good ethics’ (2007: 57). He explains that CSR warrants ethi-
cal behaviour as long as it makes a profit. What is more, the interests and 
claims of stakeholders are clearly not weighed equally to those of share-
holders. I would like to point out that this is opposed to the concept of 
CSR as suggested in our definition, initially proposed by Neal (‘businesses 
need to integrate the economic, social, and environmental impact in their 
operations’). In this light, the concept of CSR seems contradictory: on the 
one hand it contains a normative claim for respect of other stakeholders’ 
interests, but on the other hand it is based on the primacy of one group 
over others. One could argue that integrating social impact doesn’t neces-
sarily imply equating shareholder and stakeholder interests.5 That brings us 
back to the shareholder theory. This situation opens up a difficult question 
for contemporary business ethics: for how much do certain stakeholders’ 
interests count in the absence of the incentive of profit (Marcoux, 2008)? 
 In this section I have shown how the business case for CSR leads to spe-
cific moral challenges. I also brought up CSR’s paradoxical nature. CSR’s 
definition asks for the impossible – to satisfy both the duty to shareholder 
and stakeholder interests. In the next section I present a brief discussion of 
some areas of concern. By doing this, I will try to show that CSR does not 
ensure sustainable commitment to social responsibility from businesses.
5. Problems with CSR
5.1 Empirical research
I will start with the problem of empirical research into the benefits of CSR. 
Since the business case is at the core of CSR, the data that supports it is 
crucial. However, over the years the research results change, new studies 
are published and previous assumptions are falsified.6 This makes the busi-
ness justification for social responsibility unstable. What if in the future 
some or all of the currently accepted business benefits of CSR are over-
thrown? The business incentive for responsible behaviour would then be 
empirically unsupported. Unfortunately, the history of empirical research 
into CSR performance is full of studies which question the positive cor-
relation between the CSR performance and financial performance. 
 Interestingly, a study by Bird et al., exploring which CSR practices are 
rewarded by the market, concludes that only certain CSR activities result 
in market value increase (e.g. doing the minimum in areas of diversity 
and the environment, but being proactive in employee relations), while 
some result in market value decrease (e.g. being proactive in community 
and environmental protection) and other don’t have any effect (2007: 
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201–204). As we can foresee, a manager wanting to maximise shareholder 
revenue would follow certain CSR activities, while neglecting or actively 
avoiding others. In such a case, following the logic of the popular approach 
to CSR, corporations implementing CSR are unlikely to undertake an 
action that ‘only’ has moral advantages. Therefore, CSR can have a neg-
ative effect on actions which lack bottomline justification, but do have 
ethical value.
 I would like to emphasise here not only the possible negative conse-
quence, but also the risk of changing recommendations – both of which 
indicate that the business case for CSR provides no safe ground for social 
responsibility.
5.2 Shareholder interest
Secondly, I would like to illustrate the supremacy of shareholder inter-
est over stakeholder interest in a situation where CSR is believed to be 
implemented. It is generally recognised that employee diversity is part 
of good corporate responsibility. The competitive advantage of having a 
diverse workforce is discussed in CSR literature, but there is no sound 
empirical data proving that it brings tangible profits (Tanis et al., 2010). 
However, on top of the advantage of having diverse teams, a corporation 
is encouraged to employ members of minorities who may help them to 
target customers from that same minority. This commercial gain is often 
mentioned in CSR argumentation for diversity.
 In 2005 a case study was conducted in one of the Dutch banks where 
managing diversity was implemented (Subeliani & Tsogas, 2005). ‘Find-
ings show that diversity management has been used primarily to attract 
ethnic customers to the bank, rather than to advance the quality of work-
ing life and career prospects of ethnic minority employees’ (Subeliani & 
Tsogas, 2005: 831). This example shows that corporations might decide to 
use the CSR findings and its rhetoric to advance only their interests and 
not necessarily the interests of the stakeholder – the employees.
 In another situation, a company can choose to ignore the possible 
financial gains from CSR, if those are outweighed by the gains from 
other strategies. This can be observed when a company weighs the costs 
of lawsuits or fines and reputation loss amongst a population that values 
responsible behaviour in companies against these gains. CSR is treated 
here as one of the factors in the cost-and-benefit-analysis, performed from 
the shareholder perspective (Vogel, 2005).
 This can be illustrated with the issue of the number of women on 
corporate boards (Doldor et al., 2012). Even with the business case sup-
porting gender diversity in the boards, companies still don’t decide to 
follow suit. More is at stake – the interests of current board members, 
training costs, etc. Responsible behaviour is not given any priority just 
because of its moral value. Companies estimate the revenue on socially 
responsible behaviour and consider it against other, non-ethical issues.
5.3 Consumer preferences and public opinion
Now I will discuss the issue of consumer preferences. In the CSR-business 
case motivation model, companies pursue CSR because it increases their 
profits. Companies can increase profits in a direct way, for example by 
sustaining or increasing the natural resources that they exploit. A fishing 
company, for instance, would have a long-term interest in keeping the 
waters clean, so that the fish population remains stable or grows. Here, the 
state of natural resources presents an operational risk. But CSR literature 
also gives a lot of attention to another source of profits, namely reputa-
tional gain or risk. Here, a company’s good name and image are at stake, in 
other words – its “goodwill”. Since profits come from consumer’s choices 
that are influenced on the image of companies, the perceived moral char-
acter of a business is thought to translate into material gains or losses. This 
CSR model is dependent on consumer preferences.
 The obvious shortcoming is that the dependency on goodwill doesn’t 
apply to corporations with no visible brands and most “business to busi-
ness” companies. These organisations are less susceptible to public pressure 
because they do not sell directly to consumers, who, in turn, are not aware 
of or have less interest in the social performance of the latter organisations.
 This, however, could still be remedied – in part – by transparency of a 
supply chain, so that the suppliers of known companies are visible to the 
public. Various CSR standards and “best practices” introduce such trans-
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parency, so that more and more companies are in the public eye.
 But there is another problem with the reputational risk model: even 
if consumers had enough information to judge that certain company’s 
actions are against their collective interests, it might be that consumers 
just don’t care or don’t want to identify themselves with interests of the 
community that transcend their group or country. In a similar vein, peo-
ple disagree about facts and solutions to environmental and social issues. 
Therefore, their consumer choices would send different messages to the 
companies.
 A way to tackle these issues could be to agree with Hausman and 
McPherson that preferences that are shaped by mistaken popular beliefs 
should be confronted by eliciting preferences based on our best-supported 
estimates of facts and consequences of activities (2006: 286). There are 
hundreds of active watchdog organisations, governmental or non-govern-
mental, trying to yield this preference change by providing information 
that customers might lack and trying to explain collective interests (e.g. 
Bankwijzer in the Netherlands, or Clean Clothes Campaign worldwide). 
Bankwijzer in its mission statement writes:
‘The aim of the tool is to initiate a ‘race to the top’ between banks on the 
subject of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Ideally, a self-reinforcing 
process will develop in which social, environmental and economic 
standards are raised continuously.’7
However, the non-profit sector faces obstacles to the real “race to the top”, 
such as the reporting quality, lack of corporate transparency, incompatible 
data or biased answers submitted by corporate CSR departments.
 Moreover, CSR competition (via indexes, comparisons, public sham-
ing) doesn’t guarantee that the responsible behaviour is internalised. 
First of all, there are problems inherent to the competition mechanism, 
described in the next section (trying to only appear responsible and score 
well). Secondly, it is not proven that an organisation will internalise the 
moral principles after a certain time of external pressure. This means that 
watchdogs would always need to keep guard over businesses to provide the 
missing incentive for CSR performance.
 In this section I have shown that CSR performance depends on cus-
tomer preference, information and willingness to enact customer’s choice. 
This adds yet another variable to the unstable justification of social respon-
sibility based on the business case.
 
5.4 Free market competition
Another group of issues that CSR may face stems from CSR’s dependency 
on free market competition. This set of problems is generic to the competi-
tion mechanism. Free riding strategies are the collective action problems 
immanent to competition. This is because rational decision entails finding 
ways to increase profit and free riding fits into the model. Competition for 
CSR will have the same side-effects as competition in any other unregu-
lated market.
 Frank (2008), Heath (2006) and Wells & Graafland (2012) describe 
a big range of instances where competition goes wrong. I will mention 
just a few relative to CSR: ‘gaming’ the regulations means that competi-
tors are prone to doing the minimum and/or finding loopholes. Moreover, 
competition in profitable CSR can result in a whole range of competition-
related side effects, like lying, window-dressing, and dishonesty (see Wells 
& Graafland’s, 2012 discussion on virtues’ distortion).
 Here I would like to recall Friedman’s statement that even the free mar-
ket needs to adhere to some basic ‘rules of the game, which (…) engages in 
open and free competition without deception or fraud’ (Friedman, 1970). 
However, the problem here is that these extrinsic rules don’t follow from 
his market competition logic, which assumes rational choice. Sometimes it 
is rational to act dishonestly, if there is a gain. Friedman assumes a minimal 
legal framework, but it doesn’t prevent gaming the rules. The same could 
be said about the business case approach to CSR – in the first place, com-
panies are encouraged to involve in actions beneficial to them.
 What are the alternatives? Robert Frank (2011), for example, argues 
that intervention in competition is necessary for good functioning of 
groups or societies. Competition mechanism can drive groups against 
their collective interest (collective action problems). Therefore, a group 
must steer the competition in an all-benefiting direction by means of 
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laws or incentives. Certain regulations are necessary to solve collective 
action problems that are likely to occur in a competitive environment. 
Conclusion
By presenting the four types of problems above, I have tried to show that 
CSR based on a business case doesn’t always work in the best interest of 
society.  Initially, CSR seems to promise that businesses will always pursue 
social goals, because in the long run, they all pay off. However, not all social 
interests pay off.  Sometimes other commercial pursuits would be more 
profitable than ethical ones, unethical business can appear responsible to 
the public, or certain ethical behaviour can be proven to be unprofitable.
 Why is this problematic? Even if CSR doesn’t cater to all the social 
needs, aren’t there other mechanisms that take care of them?
 The limitations of CSR are indeed not problematic, so long as there 
are other institutions that deal with the areas that CSR leaves out. These 
institutions are mostly managed by the state. 
 But if we consider the retreat of the state from the moral or social 
domain and the freedom that the voluntary regulation grants businesses, 
as described in the introduction, it is possible that certain social interests 
would be addressed by neither the state nor businesses. This is because 
the state might not be the main regulator anymore in certain social areas, 
while businesses would not choose to cater to these interests because of 
their weak business case.
 In conclusion, I have argued here that CSR does not always bring 
together the market goals and interests of society. I explored the alignment 
of ethically good and profitable actions of the business and concluded that 
it is theoretically unstable and leaves space for unethical business behav-
iour. CSR inherits some of its weakness from its constitutive elements, 
like competition, shareholder supremacy and the assumption of a rational 
consumer. The next question arising from these conclusions is whether 
in order to make capitalism truly work to our advantage, the goals of the 
business world would have to be shifted. 
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Notes
1. ‘The term “marketisation” refers both to market ideologies and market-oriented reforms. 
A market ideology reflects the belief that markets are of superior efficiency for the alloca-
tion of goods and resources. […]Market-oriented reforms are those policies fostering the 
emergence and development of markets and weakening, in parallel, alternative institutional 
arrangements’ (Djelic, 2006: 53).
2. Employee protection and environmental externalities are the examples of business inte-
rests and social interests coming apart. While greater employee protection and minimising 
the negative externalities are in the interest of society, it is usually against the interest of 
businesses.
3. Collective moral responsibility refers to arrangements appropriate for addressing wide-
spread harm and wrongdoing caused by the actions of groups (Risser, 2004).
4. It could be argued that Friedman’s position is not entirely consequentialist because it 
also includes the minimal procedural constraint of having to conform to the legal frame-
work and basic ethical custom of society (Carroll, 1991). I would argue, however, that the 
consequentialism of increasing profits clearly has a ruling position here and even the basic 
constraints can be subject to the main objective of profit making, because the constraints 
are not grounded in any other meta-justification, i.e. a normative core of neoliberalism. 
The profitmaking is in the normative core of neoliberalism. Therefore laws and ethical 
custom could also be subordinated to this consequentialist principle.
5. Stakeholder theory claims that shareholder and stakeholder interests are equal.  ‘Norma-
tive ethical stakeholder theory articulates the view that a business firm ought to be managed 
in a way that achieves a balance among the interests of all who bear a substantial relation-
ship to the firm – its stakeholders. In Freeman’s account, the very purpose of the firm is 
coordination of and joint service to its stakeholders’ (Marcoux, 2008).
6. For example, the two important studies (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Orlitzky et al., 2003) 
which assessed the methodological accuracy of the existing empirical research on financial 
performance and CSR, came up with different results – one of them claimed that most of 
the studies didn’t prove financial viability, and other one denied it.
7. www.eerlijkebankwijzer.nl [accessed 23 January 2012].
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